

It was remarked to us that the conferences of the philosophical society last year were too abstract for the public. I attempted to show how the great problems of speculative philosophy arose in ambiguity. Now, speculative philosophy is easier than moral philosophy, than practical philosophy. Yet, we admit freely that our choice was not the happiest. We forgot the great Aristotelian principle according to which things that are the most knowable in themselves, are the least knowable in relation to us. Ethical problems are of all problems the most difficult. Aristotle and St. Thomas put moral philosophy at the very end of philosophy: a study of which only mature intelligences were capable.

However, as we will see in time, during periods of intellectual decadence, of intellectual fatigue, during periods in which intelligences are too exhausted to give themselves to disinterested speculation which in reality conditions all ethical philosophy, during these periods one does nothing but morality.

(page 2)

One would say, therefore, that the problems which are in themselves the most difficult seem to us to be the easiest for us. Confirmation: Do you know many people who do not have very firm political convictions, or even very loud? And yet, ideas of applied politics must be conditioned by a political ethics, which must be conditioned by a general ethics, which is in its turn conditioned by a speculative vision of the world, at once metaphysical and natural.

This year, we will take account of this Aristotelian principle, and of these undeniable facts, and I will treat of a problem most obscure, and which will oblige us often to make moral considerations of an order so opaque that all opinions that are more than vague and timid will verge on the ridiculous. And yet, I will present these opinions with all the rowdy and headstrong emphasis necessary as a condition of their probability. (page 3)

The fact of treating here certain questions which are apparently of the domain of opinion could scandalize those among you who have received a very classical philosophical formation, who have been perfectly satisfied, and who have a taste for the definitive: who interest themselves always in philosophy either to hear once again what they have already heard, or to establish that youth is lost. There are men all speculative opinion seems dreamy and dangerous: for whom philosophy is essentially a dictionary (a manual) in which is only found what is definitely established and confirmed by the weight of the ages. They do not know how to opine, because jolts of opinion are evidently disastrous for a calcined mind.

But we will speak of this phenomenon there where it will be a question of intellectual decadence. We say here that with Aristotle and St. Thomas, we believe that the philosophical life is above all a life: that it advances by groping, often very ambiguous, and that in many cases, the domain of opinion is for us the most interesting: "Magis concupiscimus scire modicum de rebus honorabilissimis(?) et altissimis, etiam si topice et probabiliter illud sciamus, quam scire multum, et per certitudinem, de rebus minus nobilibus." (De An. I,) (page 4)

I have chosen as subject of these conferences the philosopher of the superman: philosopher who has become synonymous with the system of German philosophy of the 19th Century, Nietzsche. Although for Nietzsche philosophy was essentially (?) a system of the superman, the problem of the superman is for us a simple question of

applied philosophy.

Even when we make abstraction from the Nietzschean system, the idea itself of the superman is an idea of uneasiness: for the simple reason that the superman is a human type that is only acceptable in a very abstract way. The supermen that we appreciate today are dead. They do not become acceptable until after having suffered a certain cooking process which must be extended over several years. The mass of contemporaries of the superman regard him always with a certain mistrust. I say the mass, because the superman will always have some disciples. The mass has a horror of great men. They worry it. It is not that this mass recognizes their transcendence. Do not believe that the Archbishop of Oxford -- who condemned St. Thomas, who has today become acceptable, thanks to his commentaries, his manuals, etc. -- in forbidding his students to follow the Thomist courses of philosophy and of theology under pain of excommunication, do not believe that (page 5) that these authorities recognized in St. Thomas a genius. No, he was for them a dangerous sophist, who carried out "idolis domus Dei, . . . quantum inde futuris temporibus poterit ecclesiae periculum imminere."

St. Thomas was the founder of a school that worked for the destruction of the Church - the genius was always considered as stricken by a demonic madness which will upset the established order: to such a point that a study of social phenomena surrounding him could serve as a criterion of his genius. And if our superman is accepted in his time, it would be necessary to seek the reasons for this success in a phenomenon extrinsic to his genius. This idea is historically true, and we will soon give philosophic reasons for it. For the moment it suffices to remember that when God Himself was made man - perfect man presenting manifest signs of divinity - we mocked him, we spat in his face, and we crucified him.

I know that the idea of amorphous egalitarianism leads many men to question even the type itself of the superman; and if they don't question the existence of superior types, (page 6) refuse them all truly transcendent propriety, and all transcendent right: they refuse to consider them as heterogeneous types in which nature attains an end entirely specific, to the point of meriting a totally specific mention in ethics.

And yet, there are in Aristotelian ethics two virtues which are grafted on innate natural dispositions, which characterize the superman: magnanimity and magnificence: dispositions of which it is said that they are not natural (we will see at the proper time how this term "natural" must be understood) And these conceptions were not indissolubly tied to those according to which men are naturally divided into masters and slaves: because these dispositions are not characteristic of masters. St. Thomas has incorporated the conditions of the superman in his Summa Theologiae: he elaborated and completed it. I know that today one does not speak any more of these virtues: but would this not be a sign of degeneracy of morals, rather than of the objective value of this idea? We will demonstrate at the proper time that this idea must disappear from moral treatises, as necessary consequence of post-medieval intellectual decadence. (page 7)

The very idea of the superman is a disturbing subject. But the question becomes again more grave when one proposes to study it in the work of Nietzsche. Nietzsche is without the least doubt a very dangerous man. The world has never known a greater blasphemer than the author of the Anti-Christ (?). There are in his work texts that one would not know how to read without trembling. But we have grounds to console ourselves: during his life he manifested signs of madness, and he ended

his life in complete madness.

But then, why take account of his work? Because the work, whether it be that of a reasonable man or a crazy one, has intrinsic merits: as that of Flemish painter Van der Goes, or that of Dutch painter Van Gogh. If nature has recourse to crazy men, it is perhaps because, in the absence of normal competent men, circumstances do not permit it otherwise to achieve its mission: "My ways are not your ways," said the Lord. Nature has a mission, and an end to attain despite us. Its end transcends us, and it disposes truly wonderful means which escape us.

Any consideration of the philosophy of Nietzsche could still be dangerous, because it is especially libertines who have exploited it in favor of their perverse idea of liberty. The superman of Nietzsche lives beyond good and evil (evil?) He puts himself above the law. But these authors forget that man cannot attain this superiority but by a very rigorous asceticism, because it concerns a liberty which is given to us by the fact that we know how to do the good without constraint, and to avoid the evil without bitterness: liberty which makes us master of ourselves. Do not forget the word of St. Paul: "The just man is a law unto himself."

If Andre Gide and Henry Menckens have seen in the liberty of the superman a liberty of the vulgar libertine, too bad for Gide and Menckens. (page 8) Because the system of Nietzsche was before all a brutal reaction against this degenerate idea of liberty which was in vogue for centuries, and which is today still that of most men.

It is necessary not to judge a system by the abuse that is made of it.

Most orthodox philosophical authors have considered Nietzsche as a pure decadent, his system, by its absurdity itself, was an experimental proof of the bankruptcy of modern philosophy. The work of Nietzsche was a work to downgrade.

This interpretation of the historic Nietzsche appears to me a little too simplistic. In truth, it is Nietzsche who has demonstrated the complete bankruptcy of modern philosophy by his very insurrection. His work was far from being exclusively destructive, because, as I will attempt to demonstrate, it can be considered his system as a positive point of departure to a new historical era of philosophy, and of culture in general.

I want to demonstrate in a topical manner that the philosophic system which was a logical consequence of a dialectical process which commanded the philosophical current from the XIVth to the XIXth centuries, had to be determinately a philosophy of the superman, and no other thing. (page 9)

And this philosophy must be for us an occasion from which we must profit to resume and elaborate a fundamental aspect of OUR philosophy, an aspect which was left in the shadow by our immediate scholastic predecessors. It is not a matter of following Nietzsche, it is a matter of us using him as a providential phenomenon.

Because we forget too easily the practical consequences of our metaphysical theory of the absolute transcendence of Providence, from which nothing escapes, not even the purest contingent.

It was St. Thomas who said that it is necessary never to study a philosophic system for the system. The opinions of philosophers considered as themselves, and outside

of the universal order of things, do not have any transcendent importance: "Studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum." (De Caelo I 22 n 8)

But in the same lesson St. Thomas stood with vehemence against those who want to reject a philosophical system because it contained many errors. (page 10)
Philosophy must exploit all, even the errors of others: the errors are not ever purely negative: in the universal order error, as evil, plays an essential role.

St. Albert the Great seems to have lost his good humor when he wrote in his commentary on the Politics of Aristotle: "There are men, he said, who produce nothing in scientific material, who retard their century, and who to console themselves for their own incapacity, do (ne font rien?) nothing but seek the errors of others. It is men of this temper (Srempe?) who put Socrates to death and exiled Plato . . . Just as bile poisons the entire body, so there are in the scientific life sour and bilious men, who fill the existence of others with bitterness and render it impossible for them to seek the truth." "There are stupid beasts who blaspheme what they don't know." "Tanquam bruta animalia blasphemantur in iis quae ignorant." (citation illegible - Sertill. & Deonyne?) (page 11)

Let us turn to Nietzsche, this man who, after all, has propagated, or at least occasioned, so many errors. The work of one who is dead becomes something sacred. We fight with our enemy until death. But once dead, his work acquires a definitive sense to which it is necessary to be resigned. It calls for respect, as the body of an enemy. The petrified past, definitively immobilized and unwavering, becomes an observable sign of Providence: and this sign has a meaning, and it has a lesson, a positive lesson that only those impious minds who boast always of their orthodoxy can deny.

"Quidquid fit in mundo, says St. Thomas, etiamsi malum sit, cedit in bonum universi, quia Deus est adeo bonus, quod nihil mali esse permetteret, nisi essent adeo potens quod ex quolibet malo posset elicere aliquod bonum . . . Etiam mala peccatorum in bonum justorum cedunt." Rom. c8 l4, p. 120

Nietzsche did not escape from the providential plan. This is what we will attempt to establish in detail. And we will see that his role was of an invaluable importance.

(page 12)Before passing to the study of the philosophical (and even theological) current which engendered the system of Nietzsche, (et ce courant comme par Luther?) I would like to justify this a priori dialectical framework which I am imposing onto the historic phenomena. We know how to discover in nature a hierarchical and fundamental rhythm which is a true law of nature: which is an a priori condition of evolution and of progress.

Natural history, in so far as it is a body constituted by the passive enumeration of facts, is not a science. History does not become scientific until the moment when we observe in the current of things a certain regularity, of recurrences, in brief of laws, which suggests to us a theory from which we know how to deduce the observed regularities as a conclusion.

The philosophy of history is a sapiential role of the philosophy of nature, in which we attempt to deduce, from the concept itself of nature, the necessary paths nature must follow in its flowing and in its progression. This analysis permits us to

construct a dialectical framework.

The historical critique, in the philosophical sense of the word, is one of the functions of the philosophy of history, by which we attempt to make a synthesis between the experimental theory and the dialectical theory. this synthesis must furnish us with a probable knowledge of the profound rhythm that history must follow in its flowing.

In the properly dialectical part we will establish that the concept itself of nature - principle of movement, principle which is at the same time form and matter - that this idea of nature itself implies the idea of progress. Indeed, what is the end of nature? What is, in sum, the finality of the cosmos? What is its immediate reason for being?

For the cosmos poses a problem of finality entirely specific. In the purely spiritual universe, all beings are persons, who by their intelligence and their will are capable (page 14) of a return to God, their immediate principle. But in the cosmos, one finds beings lacking intelligence: the irrationals, who are not able to realize this return. What is then their reason for being? It is necessary to seek it in the very origin of the cosmos: in what is first in intention.

Now, this must be a person, because only a person is capable of a formal return to its principle. And this person must be of a cosmic order: composed of matter and of form. It is man who must be the reason for being of the cosmos. It is man who is the first in intention, and who will be the last in execution. The inferior beings (a' lui) are not able to be but in function of man. In such a way that if one makes abstraction from man, these beings become contradictory. In other words, they entail a transcendental relation to man. It is man that first matter desires: "quanto aliquis actus est posterior et magis perfectior, tanto principalius in idipsum appetitus materiae ferturultimus igitur generationis totius gradus est anima humana (page 15) et in hanc tendit materia sicut in ultimam formam."

All the stages that the naturalist observes, all this flow to which we assist, are essentially a path toward man. This ascendant movement is natural. The inferior forms are essentially destined to be surpassed.

In the physical study of indeterminism we are able to demonstrate that this ascendant path cannot follow ways rigorously continuous and determined, as certain evolutionists of the 19th century wished. Nature advances by abrupt transformations under an irresistible force.

When a biological species attains a relatively uniform statistical equilibrium, the equilibrium is abruptly broken, it splinters: this rupture gives birth to a superior species realized by rare exceptions.

If you will, nature has a horror of flat uniformity: it tends toward a term more and more elevated. (page 16)

The evolution in nature (whether one conceives this evolution in a dynamic fashion or a static fashion) is realized by revolutions: revolutions worked by the rare cases which are detached from the majority.

But nature has not attained its end when it has disposed matter for the reception of the created spiritual form. The human species, spatio-temporal, is essentially

multiple. Now, nature is not able to aim at a perfectly homogeneous multitude of men. It does not have recourse to the multitude as multitude. The purely quantitative multiplication has nothing of the end (n'a pas di fin?). It is necessary to find even among men a hierarchy: and it is the superior ones who are truly aimed at: all cosmic revolutions are "propter implendum numerum electorum." The amorphous mass of men come to be in function of them: not, no doubt, in the manner of irrational beings, because every man is a person, but in the manner in which every inferior being is subjected to the superior: which happens even in the spiritual universe. (page 17)

We now apply this idea to men such as they are given in experience.

When one studies the distribution of a statistical ensemble, one finds out that there are two categories of extreme case which arise from the limits (cadre) of the majority; there are, if you wish, two species of exception.

If we consider a grand ensemble of men as a statistical ensemble, we observe that this ensemble is separated into three categories:

1. The majority: constituted by reasonable men.
2. A first minority constituted by imbeciles.
3. A second minority yet much smaller, constituted by supermen.

The supermen as well as the imbeciles are the exceptions in relation to the majority. Therefore, if the most probable cases (the reasonable men) constitute the law, it is understood (entendu) that the supermen and the imbeciles are the exceptions.

But a statistical law includes not only the majority. (page 18) The exceptional cases as well are included in the law: it is precisely the extreme cases who constitute the statistical character of a law.

But, since we do not confound the imbecile and the genius, it is necessary to distinguish two species of exceptions - negative and positive. The imbeciles are monstrous, but the supermen are not, although the majority thinks so.

The superman is a new qualitative acquisition for humanity: he is a success. If humanity tends to produce great men, and if great men are successes, and if the successes are the exceptions, it is that nature tends to produce exceptions in humanity. Nature tends always, and it must from its own very nature, to surpass the majority. This tendency succeeds (aboutit) exceptionally. Habitually it only succeeds in making reasonable men (ut in pluribus). Sometimes even that does not succeed - then we have imbeciles. The majority and the negative exceptions must be considered as a series of gaffes. (page 19)

However, the majority of cases and the negative exceptions are not absolute gaffes. Because the gaffes play a necessary role in nature. They exercise a certain braking (freinage) necessary for the accumulation of force - one would say that nature practices at first a parsimony for preparing its act of liberality - the equilibrium swells up to the point of exploding. This explosion includes debris, but it equally has successes.

Important thing: it is that the disequilibrium provoked by the positive exceptions arises from the equilibrium of the majority. The great men are produced by the mass. The people agonize unconsciously to put its supermen into the world. Its superior ordination takes it above.

Between the mass and the superman arises a conflict: the conflict has as consequence an elevation of the cultural level of the mass. When equilibrium is reintroduced at this acquired level: when the mass is at rest (because the struggle is followed by a great fatigue), (page 20) a new rupture has place, and so it goes. In the domain of music, for example, at the time of Beethoven, the reviews attacked in the name of previous composers; one finishes, all the same, by digesting it; but when Wagner arrives, he is criticized in the name of Beethoven; and today Stravinsky is criticized in the name of those who were criticized in their turn, etc.

Now, this is the synthesis underlying historical phenomena, and which seems to command their ascension in a spiral, which I have called the dialectical rhythm of history.

And if you hesitate even an instant to believe in the conflict which exists between the mass and the superman, between the ideal of platitude of the majority and the transcendent ideal of the superman, it would suffice to recall for the moment that when God himself was made man - perfect man presenting the most manifest signs of divinity - we mocked him, we spat in his face, and we crucified him.

Now it is a matter of studying the pre-Nietzschean philosophical currents by an application of this dialectical progression: where, if you will, we go to see how this rhythm has been physically realized in this history. (page 21)

This study, I have claimed, is extremely topical (and if utopian can please you more, think it). Especially because we are going to isolate one cultural factor alone from all the others from which it is in reality inseparable: the philosophical factor. But for this very reason, because this factor is so infinitely tied to the others, everything that we are able to recognize and connect would be able to have a certain value: even if other more important factors control that one.

It seems to us that the historical evolution of philosophy describes a series of statistical curves: or, if you will, a series of waves.

If we take as limits of the systems the most salient, the most elevated summit that has been attained in antiquity is represented by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. The following summit was attained by another trinity several centuries later by Plotinus, St. Augustine, and the Areopagite. The third by St. Thomas in the middle ages. (page 22)

It is understood that in the interior of each of these bell curves one can trace other curves, and those indefinitely. It is not a matter of denying all preparatory and conditioning work which was made between the summits of the most marked curves.

A Thomist cannot view history the history of philosophy otherwise. With St. Thomas we assist in an immense intellectual effort of humanity. St. Thomas was a superman of formidable proportion: and one can say that the difficulties that he encountered in his milieu were proportional to his greatness. Human ignorance has something of the brutal. Although it is not more cruel than weakness. Today we are spoken to

always of the persecution of Galileo, when in reality, the difficulties which this man encountered were childishness compared to those of St. Thomas. The middle ages finished by digesting St. Thomas a little. The regional excommunications of his doctrine were lifted, and the Dominican Order set to the work.

But the intelligence of humanity was extremely fatigued by this immense effort. (page 23) The curve descends. Scholastic quarrels became more and more verbal. Dogmatic theology would soon cede precedence to moral theology, moral theology also decapitated into theology of sin: the essence of virtue soon became the pure absence of sin. During periods of intellectual decadence, theologians speak only of sin. In order to justify it, they fall into a vicious circle: We speak a great deal (about?) sin, because there is a great deal of it, they say.

The descent of the curve lead us to Luther, who has exercised so profound and quasi-determinating on all modern spirituality.

Luther succumbed to fatigue. He allowed himself to this current of degradation. Here are his own words: "I am no more than a man apt to let myself enter the company (by mass) drunkenness, movement of the flesh, negligence, and other importunities. (page 24) Ego otiosus et crapulosus sedeo tota die." I am here from morning to evening and get drunk.

Matter avenges itself. It wants determination. But when it does not attain this goal, it swallows us in the gulf of its pure indetermination.

Man cannot do without intellectual and moral virtues. Luther wants to be Christian without the effort which is essential to the development of man. Luther abandoned himself to indetermination.

How is habit defined? Habit, says St. Thomas, "est dispositio quaedam determinans potentiam relate ad aliquid." Here we take habit in the specific sense of a habit acquired and operative. This habit is a determination acquired in exercise, either of abstract or practical thought or of the voluntary or sensible appetite. It must therefore not be confounded with natural disposition, (page 25) the natural penchants that we have before having posed acts. Habit superimposes itself on this natural disposition, imprinting on it a form more determinate and which, in sum, disposes us in a more immediate fashion to think, act or make well or badly. Bad habit is acquired by indulgence, while positive habit elevates us by an incessant effort to a quasi-immobile state of determination. This determination "difficulter mobilis", FREES us from indetermination, either of matter in the passions, or of our spiritual faculties. "Habitudo est id quo quis agit cum voluerit." It is the positive habits (and in what follows I intend it always in this sense) - it is the positive habits which free us from ourselves: it is in following the law that we put ourselves above the law.

Liberty is not the faculty of choosing between the good and the evil: infinitely superior is the liberty of him who always chooses the good (page 26) and the most pure liberty implies the impossibility of choosing evil.

Luther wanted to free himself from this liberty. He permitted himself to do it (?). He wanted salvation without effort, without virtue.

Notice, indeed: He wanted salvation. He attempted to flatter his God: it is the

grace of Christ which will save men despite men. Nature is so corrupt that plays no role in the work of salvation. *Pecca fortiter sed fortius fide*: sin strongly, but believe more.

But he did not convince himself of the real value of his negative speculations. He spread his doctrine in the mass of men who surrounded him: it spread like fire in straw. It is that the mass suffered as he: Luther knew an immediate success with the mob. (page 27)

Recently the protestants have made a desperate effort to save their Luther from the revelations made by Father Deruifle (?) and others. They have pretended that Luther was a superman, and that because of that he was above the law of good and evil like the superman of Nietzsche: when it is Nietzsche himself who rigorously condemned this monstrous notion of liberty which ruled during the centuries which separated Luther from Nietzsche. What characterizes Nietzsche is his re-introduction of habit, urged by one knows not what power: in Nietzsche nature avenges itself on Luther and on his destructive work. Nietzsche wanted to determine himself, to free himself from indetermination; it is Nietzsche who wanted - to use his own words: "to become hard, slowly, slowly, as a precious stone - and finally to remain there tranquilly, for the joy of eternity." (page 28)

For Luther had no joy in the world. His lack of intellectual and aesthetic taste is known.

And precisely, it will be the aesthetic sense of Nietzsche which will revolt against his predecessors. The first work of which we will speak next week, entitled "The Birth of Tragedy among the Greeks," is a profound essay concerning philosophy and art. (end of first lecture).

If we rely on hylomorphism, according to which the whole cosmos is in a state of flowing toward man, and according to which humanity itself tends to establish a hierarchy of men, a hierarchy at the summit of which are found the supermen; and in basing ourselves on the indeterminism which is only a consequence of hylomorphic composition of spatio-temporal beings, we know how to demonstrate that the unfolding (*decoulement*?) of the cosmos follows a rhythmic and spiral movement.

This ascendant movement can be schematically represented by a series of curves, of which the summits designate the successes. The success is followed by an exhaustion.

For the Thomist, placing himself at the point of view of the history of metaphysics, this spiral progression attains in antiquity three transcendent summits: 1st: Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; 2nd: Plotinus, Augustine, Areopagite; 3rd: Albert the Great and St. Thomas.

The immense effort of speculative thought in the middle ages was followed by an exhaustion of the same order of greatness.

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(page 2)

Scholastic quarrels become more and more verbal; dogmatic theology gives way to moral theology - incontestable sign of metaphysical decadence - ; moral theology, thus decapitated, degenerates into theology of sin: the essence of virtue becomes pure absence of sin. During periods of decadence. During periods of decadence theologians do not speak any more (of? than?) sin: evil becomes a good to defend.

The descent of the curve brings us to Luther, who has exercised a quasi-determining influence on all modern philosophy until Nietzsche, who will revolt against protestant and jansenist christianism.

Luther succumbs to fatigue, and is carried away by this current of degredation. But he wants to justify this surrender, in saying that nature is entirely corrupted.

Nature is so corrupt that it plays no more role in the work of salvation. *Pecca fortiter, sed fortius fide*. It dispenses us from the formation of habits which determine us and liberate us from the indetermination of matter and the unformed plasticity of our spiritual faculties.

But matter is made for determination, determination is its reason for being: it avenges itself. (page 3) This vengeance is manifest in Nietzsche: and especially in his will for power: in his affirmation of the necessity of fortitude (force). It is in this affirmation of fortitude that he meets Aristotle and St. Thomas: magnanimity and magnificence are integral virtues of fortitude: they are an overflow of fortitude: they are characteristics of the superman. Nature is made to be surpassed: it has a horror of leveling, it has a horror of cosmic tranquility. Nature is intoxicated: it is fundamentally unstable: it is inquietude by very definition. All stable points that are encountered in its evolutive progression are provisional: they are by very definition points of departure. Nature is youth: but youth is youth by its possibilities, and not by its acquisitions. A nature which does not overflow is a dead nature.

We can say that with Nietzsche we decidedly remount the slope. But the system of Nietzsche is not intelligible and important except as a phase of this propensity of thought and of human life. The person of Nietzsche does not interest us: persons always escape us: it is Nietzsche as function of history who occupies us. It is Nietzsche who played a role in the body that is humanity whom we want to study. (page 4)

In another domain, the affair of Galileo is another sign of decadence. I say the affair of Galileo, and not his physics. The opposition that he encountered in the philosophical and theological milieux, shows in a very clear manner that at this moment metaphysical thought no longer existed: only the letter of it remained. Philosophy was drowned in an expired physics. Philosophy treats of the necessary: physical theories are essentially variable. This confession therefore sterilized physics and philosophy at the same time.

Imagine: philosophy had become geo-centric! Galileo truly reversed philosophy of his time in making the earth revolve about the sun. The entire importance of man was based on his spatio-temporal position in the universe.

(help on this paragraph) But it was not only the enemies who were wrong. The philosophers (?) of the opposed camp rejoiced. Man seemed to have lost his importance: he is only that this: therefore one cannot demand a great thing from him. All at once his ideal became inferior: one cannot any more demand a great

thing from him.

To understand it we must show how the history of human thought engendered it.

Luther had put the Christian world in disarray. The protestant who lived theology in a consequent manner was a menace for all human life. Although being Lutheran, one could deny Lutheranism: there was nothing for us to defend. Lutheranism, in destroying the human person by its negation of habit, implicitly destroyed society.

In the Protestant camp a reaction arose. Calvin attempted to re-establish order in doctrine, in the human soul, and in society. But while doing this, he committed the fundamental error of Luther: he abstracted from habit, from the virtue that emanates from the subject. He attempted to re-establish order by extrinsic and violent constraint. Because if the calvinist speaks of virtue, it is not a question of virtue in the sense of habit. He imposes a framework on the faithful: he imprisons him. One is attached to the dead letter of the bible. His theology leads necessarily to a theology of prohibition. Despite its rigor, and the terror it inspires in us, it is easy. It is easy to say what one is unable to do. It is easy to say that everything is contained in the letter of the Bible. All that dispenses us from thinking, from searching: (page 5) All that draws the life from the person. When potatoes are discovered, the scottish theologians forbid the faithful to eat them, because they are not mentioned in the holy scriptures.

(It is understood, it is (not) always easy to know exactly what one can do, and what one cannot do. Now, it is habit which gives us what is called the judgment by connaturality.)

The country where the prohibitive consequences of puritanism, the child of calvinism, are most manifest, is the United States: paradise of puritans. As I said the other day, prohibition in the United States was the work of puritains. By prohibition, one wants to dispense oneself from the practice of the virtue of temperance: from the formation of this habit. Now, it isn't the impossibility of drinking because of the lack of drink that gives us the virtue of temperance! It is true that by prohibition, one wanted to destroy the immoderate desire to drink: one wanted to sterilize sensibility: Now, for St. Thomas, sterilization of sensibility is yet again against the virtue of temperance.

A doctrine which to dispense itself from positive virtue, and which wants nonetheless to keep its exterior advantages, must have recourse to violence: to a categorical imperative that crushes the human person.

The goal of morality is not to avoid sin: but to acquire strength: habits which elevate to the level of an ultimate destiny.

In this protestantism, humility is purely negative: nature is fundamentally vicious: man is nothing. Before the law, man must bow: he must aim at the destruction of his passions: the destruction of himself: he must be malleable (page 6) as first matter.

But the humility which excludes magnanimity, which excludes the greatness of man, is a vice.

(notes to be inserted here, from separate page)

X We are all tempted to be severe towards others, and to multiply the number of mortal sins for others: and to choose among the virtues those that are more agreeable for us: and of thus constituting a small chapel all to ourselves.

XX And when the saints fail to prevent humanity from walking, and drowsing, Providence sends us a heretic to shake us, and to make us understand that we are in the church militant. Oportet haeres esse, says St. Paul. "Haereticorum callida inquietudo."

(resume page 6)

With Descartes, we are present at an effort to construct a philosophical system which abstracts from the formation of intellectual habits. The disappearance of truly scientific thought, and the disarray made in the world by protestantism, led necessarily to scepticism.

Descartes attempted to construct a system that abstracted from everything that had been thought before him; and a system that the whole world would be able to understand: a philosophy of common sense. He wanted to make a synthesis of human learning "that even those who have not studied would be able to understand," he said. Leibnitz also wanted to construct such a system: "ut animus a rebus ipsis distincte cogitandis dispensetur, nec ideo minus omnia recte provenient."

Descartes sought a clear and easy system: a philosophy within reach of the whole world. In order to do this, he found himself dispensing with this laborious formation of intellectual habit which always includes a great measure of erudition. And if we abstract from everything that has been thought before, (page 7) there remains for us to know only our me. We are condemned to collapse upon our very selves: "I think": the cogito, the history of philosophy has demonstrated, was in reality an auto-phagic introversion.

As a result, philosophy becomes a work of the individual: and a philosophy for the common of men cannot be any other thing. In that it is separated from the tradition of the great philosophers who considered philosophy as a work of humanity: a work to which the collaboration of spirits is essential. He forgot the profound sense of humanity which is one united species which is achieved in the creation and the collaboration of individuals in space and time. Paradoxically, it is only by this collaboration that the individual human person can be achieved. Society has need of individuals, but individuals equally have need of society.

The fact of wanting to begin from an empty thought is quite significant of this effort to think without habit.

Rousseau attempted the same thing in the domain of morality. He had a horror of Calvinism: but he fell into the opposite excess: nature is fundamentally good: it is necessary to realize a return to pure nature. But this return to nature is perfectly negative. He wants to realize a morality without virtue. (page 8)

With Rousseau, the dogma of original sin becomes a blasphemy. Fundamentally good nature is vitiated by virtuous habits as well as by bad habits. Rousseau is in ecstasy before the indetermination of matter. His system is essentially an optimism

about prime matter.

But this conception is essentially contrary to nature. Nature is essentially dynamic and progressive: it calls for determination. Those who give themselves to nature without determination are in contradiction with nature. Even man must not give himself to nature: it is nature that must and wants to give itself to man. Nature wants to be always exceeded.

Rousseau, in giving himself to prime matter, was in contradiction with nature: since the reason for being of the latter is form: and a form more and more superior: a form which finishes by liberating itself from matter: the spiritual form.

This obsession with prime matter is manifest in his ideas of the infinite and of equality. Already in Pascal we find a profound decadence of the idea of the infinite: the infinite of Pascal is purely spatial. (page 9)

The abyss of Pascal is the gulf of prime matter. The whole idea of the metaphysical infinite is lost.

But the infinite of matter is an amorphous infinite. And wherever one finds the uniform, one finds matter. The unity of the material order is composed of homogeneous parts. Rousseauist egalitarianism is a logical consequence of his idealization of prime matter. This conception is a negation of the spiritual order, which is essentially hierarchical. And thus, it destroys all philosophy of the superman.

His conception of justice and liberty is equally penetrated with prime matter. This fraternity, this equality, and this liberty are contrary to nature, which tends toward hierarchy, hierarchy in right and in liberty. The theory of Rousseau is essentially a zoocratic tyranny. His liberty makes a convict-slave of man. (forcat)

Man is a being wedged between two infinities: that of spirit and that of matter: since the two are dark (sombre), it is very easy to lose himself, and to take the one for the other. It is the spiritual infinite that is liberating: a liberation which cannot be made except by strength, and not by desertion (abandon). (page 10)

Once again ("encore une fois"?), Nietzsche revolted against this rousseauist idea of equality or of liberty, and of justice. It is matter that takes vengeance: because it is for spirit.

The historical idea of evolution, ("nisme?") of the XIXth century, must be connected to this perverse idealization of matter. One wants to extract everything from matter, and that by the power of nature. Non being suffices to do all.

The role of Kant in all this historical process of philosophical(?) thought is to have destroyed all possibility of a speculative philosophy, once one has adopted the cartesian point of view. Kant systematically decapitated philosophy: there remained only morality: a morality blind and irrational. He said, to use his own words, "to suppress learning to make place for morality." It is with Kant that the transcendence of duty makes its solemn entry in the world: this child was baptized "categorical imperative." (page 11)

But there is nothing new here except the formula. Theologians spoke of duty for

centuries. "It is your duty! Do not ask why!" Especially not now (Surtout pas ça): because the why calls for a metaphysic, or a speculative philosophy.

The work of Kant was purely destructive: he has left us only a monstrous morality. He wanted to demonstrate that our metaphysical worries are vain. There is no place for being worried: do your duty, that suffices. In fact, Kant succeeded in giving a smug repose to much of the world.

But when a philosophy permits us to make peace with ourselves, when it gives us tranquility of spirit, you never have a graver reason to worry. Peace is found for us at a level which always exceeds us: it shows us greater and greater needs: and a true philosophy shows itself more and more insufficient.

The destructive philosophy of Kant engendered the pessimistic system of Schopenhauer. (page 12)

The essence of the world, said Schopenhauer, is will. The classic definition of man, "animal rational," is a monumental farce. It is not reason that commands: it is the will which commands the reason. Reason is a posteriori in relation to the will. Man takes his actions (pose se acter), pushed by the will. He justifies them afterward in order to justify them. (Il les justifi par apres pour les justifier?). It is impossible to convince someone of what he does not want to understand: because the will is deeper than the intelligence. Political opinions are just so much stronger as they are irrational: it is the blind will that engenders them.

The will manifests itself in the desire for reproduction: sexual passion is the most powerful passion.

Conscience constitutes only the surface of the self (du moi): every being is desire: desire of what it is not or desire of what it does not have, all desire is hard and painful (penible et douloureux). When a desire is satisfied, one is bored: one desires another thing, one desires more. The laws of the world are essentially bad. (side note) And everything that is a vehicle of reproduction is bad. From there his anti-feminism. Men deceive themselves in saying that they are making court. This language is superficial, and the women know it!

The destruction of the will is the condition of happiness. Now, destruction of the will is not possible but by the destruction of the self. Therefore, only suicide can open the doors of happiness. But this happiness is rather doubtful, since we don't exist to enjoy it. (page 13)

Schopenhauer indeed knew it: and the man who occasioned a wave of suicide in Germany, was not a suicide.

In sum, he will say suicide is useless: because the will of the world is indestructible. Even if the entire human race killed itself, nature would produce another. Let us resign ourselves, and rather make philosophy, and be especially determinists. A man who knows to contemplate the world as a succession of inevitable and fated events: this man is detached by that very fact from the world and its painful events. "Disinterested intelligence is elevated as a fragrance above the defects and follies of this world of the will," he said.

Therefore, the more a man is intelligent, the more he is capable of also commanding

the will of the world. A man has genius, he said, in the measure that his cognoscitive faculties are always more developed than his appetitive faculties. The appetitive faculties are caught in the concrete. One does not desire an abstract beefsteak. The man of genius lives in a abstract world detached from the concrete: a world of universal and essential ideas. And it is just that which makes him so maladroit in the familiar world. (page 14)

In contemplating the stars, he falls in a well. In saying the truth he injures his vision. In speaking reasonably, he shocks political men. "A man is sociable," he said, "in the measure that he is destitute of intelligence and vulgar. His faith is aesthetic, art consoles him in his solitude. But this solitude is near to folly. And it gives reason to Aristotle who said that those who are distinguished in philosophy, politics, in poetry, and in art, have a melancholic temperament."

And yet, it is these half-fools, these geniuses, who constitute the true human aristocracy.

On this conception of genius-intelligence which commands the will, Schopenhauer constructed an entire theory of art. Artistic activity is an exteriorization and particularization of the universal. The exteriorization of the work of intelligence by opposition to natural and concrete things which are the work of the blind will of the world. The artist creates a world of platonic ideas. (page 14)

In the vision of the Schopenhauerian world, art occupies the summit. The world of beauty is transcendent and liberating. One can see the setting of the sun as well from the window of a prison as from the window of a palace.

And among the arts, it is music that occupies the first place. Because music is the exteriorization of the will of the idealized world: in music the artist creates a will deprived of its pessimistic character: in music we attain the living essence of life. We grasp it in its profound dynamism. Music follows the rhythm of the cosmos on a spiritualized plan. Architecture is a frozen music, as Goethe said, but music is life itself. (page 16)

We have found in Schopenhauer a conception of the superman, and a conception of art. Nietzsche was first struck by this theory of art. Since the philosophy of Nietzsche is the subject of this course, we should hold ourselves to the chronological order of his philosophical thought. Now, his philosophy of superman is only a consequence of his philosophy of art. We will pause ourselves first of all on that.

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, born October 15, 1844 at Rocken near Leipzig. He was the son of the pastor of this small town, and later followed his father to Naumburg, where the latter had been born. It was there that he began his studies. Desiring to dedicate himself to classical philology, he then went to the University of Bonn, where he received the teaching of the celebrated teacher of his time, Ritschl, and in 1865 he followed him to Leipzig. It was in the course of these latter years passed at the University of Leipzig that he encountered Richard Wagner, certain of whose works he had already known.

Without waiting for Nietzsche to have passed his promotion exam, the University of Basel appointed him to the chair of classical philology. (page 17) He was then 24 years old. The University of Leipzig conferred on him the doctorate, without making him take the preliminary exam. He had the gift of attracting young minds to

himself. The celebrated Burckhardt said of him, "Basel has never possessed a professor like him."

In 1872 he published his work, both philosophical and philological (for Nietzsche indissoluble) entitled The Origin of Tragedy Among the Greeks.

In this study, Nietzsche strove to take all development of art back to the opposition of two aesthetic instincts of nature: two instincts which are symbolized by two Greek divinities: Apollo and Dionysus.

Dionysus represents the orgiastic element as it was manifested in antique Bacchanalia. It is a mixture of ecstatic voluptuousness, of joy and terror, and has for effect to dissolve the limits of the soul, and to melt the individual in the ensemble of nature. It dissolves - he said - the principle of individuation. (page 18)

The nature of this instinct is rendered accessible for us by the physiological appearance of intoxication. Art which corresponds to it is music.

In opposition is found the modeling instinct of perfect form represented by Apollo. In it are harmonized equilibrium and measure, wisdom and serenity: it maintains the individual within the interior of its limits, and defends it from all excess. The power of this instinct is manifested physiologically by the beautiful illusion which is born from the world of dreams. Aesthetic forms which result are sculpture and the plastic arts.

For Nietzsche, the origin and essence of attic tragedy reside in the reconciliation and fusion of these two antagonistic forces: it is a form of art which participates at once in Dionysus and Apollo. (page 19)

Born of the archaic dithyramb, which celebrated the sufferings of Dionysus, tragedy was furnished at its origin only with a chorus, whose participants, transfigured by the Dionysian intoxication, ended by considering themselves the servants of the divinity, as satyrs. In exteriorizing this vision, which it has itself engendered, the chorus reaches a state of Apollonian perfection.

Drama is accomplished, therefore, under the form of an Apollonian demonstration of Dionysian revelation." The parts chanted by the choir, with which the tragedy is intermingled, are in a certain measure, the womb of the tragedy. They constitute the Dionysian element properly speaking, while the dialogue represents the eternal Apollonian.

The conjunction of these two elements gives us the "tragic optimism" of Greek drama. Pessimism is a sign of decadence, while optimism is a sign of superficiality. (page 20)

Joy is the daughter of sorrow. True optimism is essentially tragic.

We have remarked on the influence of Schopenhauer on this thesis: Dionysus - this is the cosmic will; Apollo - this is philosophic and artistic intelligence.

but Nietzsche went further. Cosmic will is a condition of progress. No Apollonian form can be considered as definitive. Forms are only stepping stones. Matter and form are innovating principles. All stages are provisional. Every stop is a sacrifice to

form, and the sterilized; every return, every retreat is a fall into indeterminism. Life must be a constant struggle between form and matter. Form must overcome matter, determine its power which cries out for (vers) liberation.

Nietzsche attributes the decadence of Greek philosophy (page 21) to the excessive predominance of the Apollonian element. Philosophy is detached from life, and most particularly from art.

Even philosophy must respect Dionysus, and even the mathematician. Does not mathematics advance by unreasonable goods? (bons?) There were poets in this world before philosophers. The philosopher has need of these intoxicated men who are propelled by demonic powers. Yes, poets choose means: but from whence come the things they desire to express?

Nietzsche does not wish that the angel be fashioned on earth. We are in a universe that passes. But where does this current take it?: "Alles ist im Fluss, es ist wahr; aber alles ist auch im Strom: nach einem Ziele hin." Nature is an appeal to which it is necessary to respond by Apollo: by determination.

What Nietzsche has equally made to stand out, in this study, is the fecund power of pain (douleur). It is not any more a matter of this passive attitude with regard to suffering; Nietzsche seizes it, to extract life from it, to extract joy from it. The whole of nature tears itself apart, to give birth to the supermen.

And to finish, it would perhaps be fitting to cite a text of Paul: (text omitted) (Romans 8:22? DQ)

Lecture 3

The God Dionysus is the translation of the obscure, brutal, and irrational flux of the cosmos toward its transcendent term: it is the translation of this cosmic ecstasy which overthrows all established forms. Apollo, on the contrary, tends toward the possession of self, toward equilibrium, toward the domination of form. He is the god of contemplation: the god of immobility: the god of the plastic arts. Dionysus is the god of music. The plastic draws us from the outside; but music installs itself in us and carries us along: it translates flow, the dynamism of the universe.

Apollo is without doubt the ideal, but the ideal finds itself always beyond the term attained. Dionysus is a transitive phase: but the transition, the path of mobility (le cheminement la mobilite?) is essential to the cosmos: cosmic beings are form and matter: matter is there to make up for the imperfection of form.

The conflict between acquired forms, and the transcendent ideal of the cosmos, inserted in matter, gives birth to this dramatic and tragic character of nature. Nature is tragic, because all generation requires a corruption, a destruction. Tragedy which is dominated by an optimism, since to the destruction of one being corresponds the generation of another. (page 2)

The lion who (lu? hu?) and devours the deer is an image of the conflict between Apollo and Dionysus. the deer is an Apollonian form: it is an acquisition: but this acquisition is

provisional. the lion tears it apart: because nature must progress: the deer must be assimilated in a superior form. (Note: "cf Ia q 96, a 1, ad 2nd: All that is natural, and existed in the state of innocence) Nature thus continues toward its term by alternative predominances of the Dionysian and Apollonian elements. Apollo establishes an equilibrium; Dionysus introduces a rupture. Nature advances thus by a series of successive explosions, like a gun (fusil?)

Dionysian excess casts (rejetter?) us into barbarism; Apollonian excess is a sign of decadence. Rousseau is a barbarian; Descartes is a decadent. It is necessary to reconcile the two elements: it is necessary to equilibrate them: it is necessary to establish between them an equilibrium which will be unstable by definition. This equilibrium cannot be maintained except by power, by force (la force). Force maintains us in the right mean which is the summit between the two opposed terms. To dominate them, an excess of force is necessary: a power which transcends them without destroying them: and here is what characterizes the superman: he is at once Apollonian and Dionysian. The common man is one of the two to the exclusion of the other. (page 3)

The Apollonian looks behind himself: he is a praiser of past time. He is presumptuous: he is satisfied with himself. But the angel of God has said: "Flee for your life; do not look back or stop anywhere in the valley; flee to the hills, lest you be consumed." And the wife of Lot who looked back became a pillar of salt. The Dionysian says: let us eat, drink and dance, because tomorrow we will be dead. And tomorrow he will be dead.

The great man is the one who flees to the hills. "When Zarathustra was thirty years old, he left his home and the lake of his home, and went into the mountains."

For Nietzsche, there exist in fact two moralities: the morality of the flock which vegetates in the plain: the zoocratic morality; and the morality of the superman who inhabits the mountains: the morality of the aristocrat. Zoocratic morality is rationalizing, or libertine. The morality of the superman, who cultivates force, a morality which elevates us outside ourselves. The zoocrat wants to justify his mediocrity: he is egalitarian. He flees effort, he detests the difficult, and he wants all men to detest it. "Ye higher men," says Zarathustra, "learn THIS from me: On the market-place no one believeth in higher men. But if ye will speak there, very well!" The populace, however, blinketh: "We are all equal."

"Ye higher men,"—so blinketh the populace—"there are no higher men, we are all equal; man is man, before God—we are all equal!" (page 4)

The morality of the populace is a morality of negative humility, and morality of feebleness, a morality of pure pity. The populace has horror of all that makes them quiver, of all that is terrible. It does not avow itself incapable of heroism: it is ignorant of the heroic. Its life is a passive attempt. It seeks rest at its level. It says: "we are a brave people, the good God loves us. It tends to do away with hell by love for mankind.

But God did not say: "this poor humanity"; He did not say: "they are all the same a brave people, and I will pardon them."

No, he descended from heaven, he was made man in order to make himself tortured and assassinated by them. They killed him because he was superior, because he was not at their level. The zoocrat wants to be with him in the world, although we are not made to be with him. Vulgar man seeks to reconcile things with himself; he wants to be approved. While the superman seeks to adapt himself to things. (page 5)

The populace defends itself by perverse notions of charity, of prudence, and of justice. Its charity is an indulgence which puts the subject on the level of the object, although it is supposed to raise it. Its prudence is a justification of mediocrity by rationalizing reason. Its right mean is not a summit, it is found on the level of the extremes. Its justice is based on a materialistic conception of order.

In this morality, there is no place for greatness. It can always give reasons for not being magnanimous or magnificent. It is a morality without virtue.

But Zarathrusta says, "man is a thing which must be surmounted, this is why you must love the virtues, - because it is by them that you will perish. I love that which the soul unloads, to the point that it forgets itself . . . , because thus all things will contribute to his decline." We must kill in ourselves the old man: we must overcome indetermination: "become hard."

Nietzsche, the philologist, aspires to establish this distinction between the morality of slaves and the morality of masters: on philological considerations.

(page 6)

It is necessary to say that there are in German two terms to express the bad: schlecht, and bose (umlaut "o"), which we will translate provisionally by "bad" (mauvais - schlecht), and "evil" (mechant - bose). The term "bad" was attributed by the superior classes to the inferior classes. Originally, this term designated simply the ordinary, the common, and then, vulgar, bad. The inferior classes applied the term "evil" to superior classes: it signified originally "irregular, incalculable, unfamiliar, dangerous, cruel."

Inferior classes fear the superior man as a disintegrating force. "The great man," says a Chinese proverb, "is a public disaster."

"Good" has equally two significations: for the masters, it designates the powerful, the courageous, the warrior, the divine. ("gut" = "gott"); in the mouth of the people, "good" signifies "familiar, peaceful, innocent, kind."

These two moralities represent two diametrically opposed currents. Opposed as the current of degradation of energy of physics; and the current going toward forms more and more organized, more and more perfect, of biology. (page 7)

The morality of slaves wants to realize a return to the amorphous indetermination of matter. The morality masters wants to create an armature of habit which elevates us above ourselves: which renders us divine. Hence the emphasis on force.

The morality of slaves is essentially impious. It tends to the destruction of all spontaneity. It codifies. It formalizes. It destroys reason. It tends towards independence: it becomes the categorical imperative. It erects itself above metaphysics. It has a horror of metaphysics, because the latter opens horizons too vast: it gives us vertigo. Vertigo must be ruled by force: but force is terrible; arduous, requires a positive and constructive asceticism. This morality is impious, because it uses God as an instrument. Having exiled reason, having banished metaphysics, it (fouch? bonct?) (thinks? wishes?) that it justifies itself. To do this, it declares all laws divine after having turned them? (le des?) from God toward whom morality should elevate us, after having demolished reason, which is the very essence of morality. Laws become extrinsic constraints which destroy us. They (eisent? crisent?) the destruction of the passions, although the passions are the triumph of nature, and although they are essential to morality. (page 8) They establish feebleness as an ideal.

It is not the populace as such that has invented this morality. Its author is found in the populace, but he is distinguished from his brothers in this that he seeks to legalize the contradictory requirements of the mass. This man is called the Philistine. He affects greatness: he says that he is the friend of men. He claims to have assimilated the wisdom of the ages. He is of an impudence quite discouraging. He is divinized human foolishness. He is the mediocre type who makes himself normal. He wants to realize happiness systematically in platitude. He sees anarchy in everything superior to himself.

He is the one who says to the populace: do you see this man? He is the enemy of humanity, because he wants to impose an ideal of pride. He is a disturber of public order. He is an anarchist. And the populace listens to it, it exiles him or kills him. And ten years later the Philistine returns. And he claims to have assimilated the wisdom of the assassinated man. And another great man comes. And he is killed, and thus it goes on. And the Philistine thus always looks to the past, and he vegetates on his skeleton: and he transforms life into a column of salt. (page 8)

In him is manifested the bitterness of the small, which has a horror of greatness, and which wants to take revenge on it. And it is only capable of sadistic joys.

The Scribes and the Pharisees have not disappeared from the face of the earth. They live among us, and they will crucify until the end of time: and the populace will always be his instrument: and he will always be the hero of the populace: because he tells it: you are a brave people, defend yourselves. He says that he believes in God, but he is perversely agnostic: because he does not want God to mingle himself in the life of men: and when God himself comes among us, he killed him in the name of God: because his morality is a morality of the slave. Now God did not come that we might be slaves: but free children.

The good and the evil of the Philistine, the moral norms that he imposes on the mass, norms which the mass accepts from him (de que?), must be exceeded by the superman: they are perverted notions: in reality this easy good is an evil, and this hard evil is a good. Ever since (Des lors), Nietzsche will say, the superman must elevate himself beyond good and evil. (page 10) It is necessary that he become wicked, and terrible, powerful and magnanimous.

This distinction which Nietzsche establishes between the morality of slaves which erects feebleness into supreme right, and the morality of masters which divinizes force, this distinction, is it well founded and justified?

Without a shadow of a doubt. And these two moralities exist today in the interior of Christendom. If we consider them on a very grand scale, we would be able to say that the morality of slaves is represented by Protestantism and Jansenism, to which is opposed the heroic morality of authentic Catholicism, which we recover in authentic Thomism.

Protestant morality, when it is not a proclamation of the rights of feebleness, of which we find today the vestiges, among others, in the criminal limitation of legalized births - and that is quite in its logic: one wants to free humanity from its sufferings by a softening anesthetic - when it is not a proclamation of rights of feebleness of pecca fortiter, it has recourse to extrinsic constraint without virtue, without personal effort, without the real force (page 11) of Puritanism and of Jansenism, which formalizes the law and which imposes on us a perverse doctrine of force.

Nietzsche knew only Protestant and Jansenist Christianity, and this is what it is necessary never to forget. Because all these vociferations against Christianity are in fact directed against decadent Christianity, Christianity which is subject to the law of rhythmic and spiral evolution of history.

Nietzsche set himself up against this morality of feebleness. How was he to do it if not in opposing force to it? And yet it would be necessary to affirm the necessity of force in what it has of the more powerful: in its excess, in its realized greater extension in magnanimity and magnificence which characterize the Aristotelian and Thomistic superman.

In the first lecture, I said that the philosophy which (page 12) will reascend the slope toward a new summit, the philosophy to which must lead the dialectical current of post-medieval philosophic thought, must be a philosophy of the superman: a philosophy which will be before all a moral philosophy, and which will reintroduce the necessity of force; the force which is essential to all virtue.

Why must this reactionary philosophy come? Because nature is defeatist. Because nature will infallibly attain its term; because Dionysus is immortal; because vengeance is essential to nature. One can abuse it up to a certain limit, but one cannot destroy it. When men become incapable of affirming it, it is affirmed by its very self, and it affirms itself in the strangely absurd system of Nietzsche. Because Nietzsche is not someone: he is a will for power without reason. His affirmation is blind. It manifests itself as a need: it is not the product of modern philosophic reason. (page 13)

It is a revolt against Apollonian rationalism, by opposition to authentic intellectualism. It is equally a revolt against morality without reason: in other terms, an irrational revolt, irrational in relation to us, since it is not in the reason of modern philosophy, against irrational morality. But this revolt, irrational in relation to us, manifests a reason indeed more profound than ours: that which nature works and acts before all human reason.

This revolt breaks out with Nietzsche, but it was already prepared, not by modern philosophers, but by those who are called men of letters. It is in literature that it is necessary to seek its roots; among the a-philosophical moralists and the German poets. Which demonstrates in an experiential manner the role of Dionysian ecstasy in philosophy. (page 14) And after all, the philosophers cannot do without the poets. The historical fact that the poets preceded the philosophers is entirely significant.

Let us speak now of the French influence on Nietzsche. In Nietzsche's own opinion (De l'avis? meme de Nietzsche?) it is the old Montaigne which inspires his critique of the herd spirit which grounds the morality of slaves. "It is believable that there are natural laws, Montaigne said, as they are seen in other cultures; but among us they have perished." "Laws of conscience, which we call born of nature, are born of custom; each, having in internal veneration the opinions and customs approved and received by him, is not able to depend on himself without remorse." "It is necessary to get rid of this violent prejudice of custom." "One senses his judgment all overthrown and (remis pourtant en bien plus sur etat?)" This "overthrown judgment," here is everything that distinguishes the free spirit from the vulgar. "For the vulgar, the laws are maintained in belief not because they are just, but because they are laws. (page 15) No legislation, says Montaigne, when "it (attacherfait?) ten thousand laws, knows "the infinite diversity of human actions. All these laws attached to us make us play a role, "as role of an borrowed personage, and they are causes that most of our vocations are farcical."

Montaigne had reason: because he makes appeal to habit, which furnishes us judgments by connaturality: which permit us to judge in this infinite diversity of human actions; while Puritanism and Jansenism impose on us from without and by constraint this infinity of moral rules, throw us outside of ourselves, and make us play the impersonal role of an borrowed personage. On the contrary, Montaigne sees nothing in the philosophy of pity but an effect of the "facility, affable and indolent." Montaigne wants an education "which changes us into better men." It is necessary to attach it not to the soul, he says, by the surface; it must be in the body.

It is necessary to free man from his state of impotence, not by annihilation, but by an elevation.

It is the philosophers who must liberate humanity from its state of slavery. "Someone," he wrote, "who asked Socrates (Crates?) how long it was necessary to philosophize received this reply: until there are no longer (asniers?) who conduct our armies" Nietzsche had more hope. For political and military tasks, the (aniers?) always suffice; but it is for the philosophers to find the means of conducting, unwittingly (a leur insu?), the (aniers?)"

For Pascal, writes Nietzsche, I almost have affection, because he (mu infiniment inbruit????): he is therefore the only Christian. And what he loves in Pascal, is his revolt against the philosophy of his time, which by its superficiality and its artificial character, were against nature. It is the courage that he admired in Pascal, and not his Jansenism. (page 17)

The influence of the great poet Goethe is more important. "It is necessary," Goethe had said, "that every perfect thing in its genus surpass this genus; it is necessary that it become something different, incomparable." Everything that is great and intelligent exists only in the minority. Goethe had already spoken with a contemptuous pity of this more prudent and enlightened humanity, but denuded of energy, which is being prepared; and he saw coming the time when God, in disgust, would be obliged to tear the universe in pieces for a new (rejeunie?) creation."

The hero of The Brigands of Schiller is already an imperfect image of the superman of Nietzsche. But he is still too humanitarian, and even too Dionysiac. He suffers too much contempt of the masses. He is not sufficiently fatalistic -- he perishes in vengeance, (page 18) although the work of the superman must be essentially constructive.

But all these influences are purely extrinsic. They never give reasons. They present only aspirations. While Nietzsche wanted to make realities of them. But he did not overtake the will of the superman.

I said just now that the system of Nietzsche is an absurd and fundamentally contradictory system. He creates a superman, but he has absolutely nothing to give him. He must exceed himself indefinitely. This is very well, but to what is this going to lead? Does there exist an ideal? The superman must slowly become a precious stone for the joy of eternity. But what is this eternity that he promises to us? He answers us by the doctrine of eternal recurrence. The universe grows in the Dionysian and Apollonian conflict: it produces the supermen who are the ultimate ends; it arrives at the point of saturation, the whole process (page 19) begins anew, and thus to infinity. We will listen an infinity of times again in this same room. Frightful conception, it must be admitted. And Nietzsche himself admitted it.

How to explain this illogism so brutal and sterile? At the time of Nietzsche there existed nothing of metaphysics. All philosophical systems were essentially and exclusively cosmologies. The metaphysics of which Kant spoke, his notions of substance, of causality, etc., were not metaphysical notions. The philosophy of Hegel never surpassed the first degree of abstraction: he never came to know the implications of the principle of contradiction. His non-being is something of the very real, his non-being is first matter. The universe of Schopenhauer is an exclusively cosmic universe, and his will of the world is again first matter. (20)

Postmedieval philosophy has no metaphysics. Even in Christendom, Molina is an irrefutable proof of it. In order to explain human liberty he is obliged to reverse all of metaphysics: he did it without knowing it, and without admitting it. But he did it all the same. With Suarez, we are present at the solemn inauguration of the supremacy of the imagination in the domain of philosophy. Each time that he abandons St. Thomas, whom he read attentively, he does it by reason of the order of the imagination.

Beginning with Wolfe, philosophy of nature is called metaphysics. And here again an experiential proof of the rhythmic current which rules the history of human thought. In it one was returned to the presocratic state of philosophy. And Nietzsche himself has not surpassed it. He never understood Plato and Aristotle. (page 21) Metaphysics was not in the air. This was fatal. He affirmed the necessity of going beyond the cosmos, but he did not succeed in detaching himself from it. He would, moreover, fall into the void.

We have remarked that his theory of art is essentially cosmic: his works of art are always given birth by Dionysus. And he affirms the superiority of music because it is Dionysiac. Nietzsche has seen Greek culture only through Heraclitean glasses: reality is universally becoming. Henceforth, the artistic exteriorization of reality in its most

intimate depths will be a dynamic exteriorization, an art which arises in time: a cosmic music as that of the young Wagner: and that of Beethoven may already be. In this music time is essential, as in all romantic music. (page 22)

But there is a music which transcends the cosmic flux. There is the music of a Johan Sebastian Bach, which arises in time, it is true, but here, time is purely accidental even in being necessary. Bach has said things which will be true even when time exists no more. His music is an insinuation of this spiritual immobility which has no need of pursuing existence, which possesses it in an instant. Bach's music is a narration in time of a meta-temporal life.

Nietzsche has an obscure knowledge of the insufficiency of the cosmic in art, of which one can see a preview in his revolt against Wagner. But instead of an appeal to Bach, he turned toward Bizet: an absolutely inexplicable deviation if not by his lack of metaphysics: by his lack of lived spirituality. (page 23)

But this absence of lived spirituality removes nothing of the importance and the historic depth of his philosophy.

Nietzsche said at just the right moment: I want the superman: man must surpass himself: I want force. He felt the need of it. He said to us that the morality of masters is not that of slaves: but he did not tell us in what consists this morality of masters.

I say that Nietzsche is, in a certain point of view, the most important of the modern philosophers: I do not say this because it is said (?) - that is to me absolutely indifferent -- it is that I attempt to demonstrate it: and if I attempt it, it is because it is not said. I say it.

And that Nietzsche is of an inestimable importance, this is what is proved by the attacks of which he has been the object (page 24)

(missing line?)

orthodox which are very often synonyms of Philistines.

We want the superman: it is not what there is of the arduous and terrible in Nietzsche which frightens us. If we do not stop at Nietzsche, it is because we want a superman infinitely greater: because we are more demanding than he. Because we are required by God.

It is this man that I will attempt to describe in the following lecture.

Lecture 4

Nietzsche part 4 (throughout, the word "force" is here taken as "fortitude" - perhaps "strength would be better? Toward the end, CDK calls "force" a "cardinal virtue" DQ)

"A people, says Nietzsche, is the detour of nature to achieve six or seven great men. Yes: and then to leave them by the side of the road." (Read P. Ch. 342-3 ?)

All modern thought since Luther was against Nietzsche, and Nietzsche knew it. In the Gay Science, he defended the Church against Luther. Read pages 357-9.

Also read page 361

Can one thus distribute humanity into two categories? Can one justify Nietzsche? Are we not all equal before God? And is not the Christian religion accordingly an essentially egalitarian religion? Before responding to this very complex question, we will study humanity from the very beginning, from a strictly philosophical point of view. This manner of proceeding is legitimate, for grace does not destroy nature.

What is the absolute origin of humanity, and what is its absolute end? To comprehend this, it is necessary to attend to the very birth of humanity. Man, says St. Thomas, is found at the lower limit of the hierarchy of intellectual beings. The pure spirits constitute a hierarchy of species absolutely distinct, which subsist outside of the entire natural genus. (page 2)

Their essence constitutes a degree of achieved perfection. Each individual realizes a pure species. These species, hierarchised according to their degree of perfection, constitute an ensemble which is so much the more one, in that it is constituted by beings fundamentally different. A hierarchical ensemble, that is to say, composed of heterogeneous parts, constitutes a unity of order, a unity of essential order when the parts are of heterogeneous essences. An ensemble of homogeneous beings, such as men, constitutes only a unity of accidental order. Accordingly, one must say that two angels, which are essentially different, are more one than two men, who however entail the same definition.

With Aristotle and St. Thomas we make a distinction between unity, transcendental property of being, and unity, principle of number. There is a transcendental unity in the measure that there is of being. Therefore, pure spirits A and B, just in being more distant in perfection than B and C, are more one than B and C. A man and dog are more one than two dogs, and so on.

These considerations allow us to comprehend how the cosmic universe of space-time takes birth.

Pure spirits A and B are more distant in perfection than spirits B and C. That is to say, that in descending the scale, spirits resemble each other more and more. If now we descend this scale to the bottom, we finish by finding two spirits which resemble each other indeed (de faite?); two spirits who are essentially equal: two spirits who entail the same definition. But these two spirits themselves will be more than pure spirits. While the pure spirits entail a simple essence, it is necessary here to decompose the essence, since it must be realized in several individuals. This decomposition of essence cannot be realized except by a composition of the individual essences: it is necessary to posit in the interior of the individual essence a principle of opposition, a principle of individuation, that we call first matter. Where there is a multiplicity of individuals in the same species, there are composed essences: composed of matter and (on?) form(s?).

Multiplicity of homogeneous individuals implies homogeneous opposition: the parts of an ensemble, since they are similar, are exterior to one another: they constitute a homogeneous exteriority: they constitute a spatial order. A complex essence calls for a complex existence: it cannot have a simple existential act. It is not able to have a complex simultaneous existence, because the essence, despite its composition, is one. Therefore, it can only have an existential act in a successive manner: it exists successively. And this succession must be continuous, because the essence cannot lose its identity in the succession: it must always be the same being that exists successively. Therefore, a being of complex essence is a being which endures successively and continuously, that is to say, that it is spatio-temporal.

And here is the absolute origin and foundation of this universe of mobility which goes on, which pursues its perfection. Spatio-temporal species cannot be completed in one individual alone. They effect a compensation in multiplication: humanity is a species which enriches itself by multiplication.

And now we are going to understand why I have made these rather abstract reflections: this multiplication cannot be the goal of the human species. The goal of this multiplication is the unity of the species. Not an accidental unity, but an essential unity: essential in the measure possible. The accidental is never the end.

Now, essential unity cannot be realized except by heterogeneous parts. Therefore, humanity tends to constitute itself in a hierarchical ensemble. This ensemble cannot be composed of different essences, but this does not prevent that in reason of the infinite plasticity of matter, men can differ substantially, because substance is the root of accidents in which we can establish a difference between men. (page 5)

This hierarchical unity of humanity is constituted by the different degrees of perfection of its individuals. There will be the superior men, and the inferior men. Humanity imitates in its own manner, in the interior of the same species, the angelic hierarchy. Egalitarianism is manifestly based on a materialist conception of unity: on a confusion of transcendental unity with the unity which is the principle of number: unity which implies an homogeneous matter, and which is of an infra-spiritual order. One sees also how the abandonment of metaphysics entails equally the abandonment of transcendental unity, for which will be substituted unity by confusion and shapelessness (amorphe?) of first matter. Monism will be a logical outcome of this materialist conception of the one and the many.(page 6)

Although for a Thomist, the universe is, in its great variety, infinitely more one than the universe of the monists. The Thomist universe is so profoundly one that it blossoms (eclo?) in specific and substantial differences. The unity of hierarchical humanity is infinitely more profound than the unity of an egalitarian humanity.

Up to this point, we are in agreement with Nietzsche. But Nietzsche says equally that the mass is in function of the great man. That a people exists in order to produce some rare superman. In Thomism, we make a distinction. As persons, intellectual beings are directly subordinated only to God. But no finite intellectual being is "pure person." By (?) their degree of perfection, they are hierarchically subordinated: and in this measure, every inferior is in function of the superior (translation help?) And if this idea is essential to Thomist (surgeology? sounds like a pretty cool study, eh?) it is it to the advantage of the individuals of a species (help!!!!!!?????) If men are persons, they are far from being substantial species: they are only parts of the human species. But men are not purely functional (useful?) in the manner of the infra-human species, of which man is the entire reason for being. (page 7) Egalitarianism is therefore a divinisation of man.

I said the other day that the theory of eternal recurrence of Nietzsche is the image of the bankruptcy of his system. He has established a hierarchy in the interior of each historical cycle, in its path toward the superman. But the cycles are in their turn equal. He thus seeks for the achievement of things in their pure multiplicity. He falls, on this superior plan into the error which he condemned concerning the structure of individual cycles. And that is understood. He did not have metaphysics. He cried out for metaphysics, but he did not find it. We have seen that he only knew dramatic and comic art. This art is true: it is, in the domain of the music Beethoven and Wagner (?). But this art, as this philosophy is not able to end. It can be only a phase - I do not say a phase an exclusively historical phase, because there is something of the eternal in the truth of the cosmos -- ; it is a phase of the life of the individual himself: it is necessary to surpass these men. But it cannot close itself, it cannot complete itself: this art cannot close up on itself. There is nothing more profoundly sad than the IXth symphony of Beethoven, which is (page 8)an ode to joy. And the triumph of the Vth only conducts us to the end of the symphony.

We also, we have a doctrine of recurrence: but our recurrence is not homogeneous and linear: it is spiroidal. The historic rhythm follows an ascensional movement: that is to say that the summit of each cycle is more and more elevated. This rhythm is essential to nature, one finds it again in the doctrine of generation and corruption. There are generation and corruption in the concrete life of human culture. And grace does not destroy this rhythm. This rhythm serves the integral order. It attains even the theologians.

Most christians have a monstrous idea of history. The summit of history would be in the past, and the world would be henceforth in a state of degeneracy. We descend henceforth to hell. But the mass of the old have said this since the beginning of humanity. This lazy idea, defeatist and morbid, is, for a Thomist, Manichean and subtly blasphemous. Corruptions are for generation, and when there are no more generations, there will be no more corruption. And this world here below will be assumed in the resurrection.(page 9) The world only achieves itself at the summit, and its achievement will be an assumption.

The superman of Nietzsche is characterized by his will for power. Nietzsche makes appeal to fortitude, and even to an excess of fortitude. In the last lecture we traced the degeneracy of the idea of habit. Man took revenge on the effort that was required of him: and Nietzsche took revenge on this vengeance. By his appeals, he wanted to reinstall habit. His cry had an impact, and the Thomist is able to recognize it.

In Thomist ethics, the word fortitude can have two senses. (II II q. 123 /a.2) Following the first, fortitude is nothing but a certain firmness of soul; thus understood, it is a general virtue, or to say it better, a condition of all virtue, since, as Aristotle says, it is essential to virtue to act in a firm and unshakable manner. Following the second, fortitude is a 'firmness,' whose unique function is to support and push these assaults, these extreme perils in which it is most difficult to stand firm. "Fortitudo est circa terribilia." It is in this sense that (page 10) fortitude is called a special virtue, provided that it has a determinate matter.

But fortitude is needed by all men. How is it able to be characteristic of the supermen? And if all men are called to fortitude, it is that all men are called to be supermen, which destroys the idea of the superman, as we have presented (exposee) it.

Yes, but the particular virtue of fortitude includes several parts, of which two are explicitly reserved for great souls, for those who are naturally great, who are born great: magnanimity and magnificence: "actus magnanimitatis non competit cuilibet virtuoso, sed solum magnis." (q. 29, a 3, 2nd) The act of magnanimity is therefore not given to all, but reserved to great souls. And the fact that these virtues need an innate greatness, and (qui tient a?) physical complexion of the individual - nobilitas animae sequitur bonam complexionem corporis -, this innate greatness which is just a disposition, does not impede magnanimity being a virtue: "Nec tamen est contra rationem virtutis quod ex naturali complexione aliquis habeat naturalem inclinationem ad virtutem." q 123, 1, 3rd. (page 11)

Before treating of these virtues, we will speak first of their subject, and of the presupposed natural disposition: because one can be a great man, without being magnanimous, since magnanimity designates the virtue, the habit grafted onto the disposition. This subject is a necessity of nature. It is this subject who is the superman in the Nietzschean sense. He is an angel, but it is not decided if he will be white or black: it is habit that will give him his color.

But this man is already a superman in relation to the mass. And the superman is already here in his absolute sense: that is to say, as truly opposed to the mass. Because the requirements of magnanimity are so transcendent, that they cannot be realized but by exceptional men.

If we take the qualifying (qualificatif?) superman in this sense, then men of great genius, whether they be virtuous or vicious, fit into this category. These men are great in life (vie?) or in virtue. And the bad men can have an enormous destructive power: the bad habit will correspond (page 12) to the natural disposition.

We have returned, therefore, to a question of definition. This definition is however very demanding. If we define the superman by his capacity of magnanimity: the capacity will correspond to the requirements of the virtue of magnanimity. And by

this very fact, the one-sided genius could not return into this category. But if one wants to call any genius whatever a superman, as Schopenhauer meant it, - that is a question of definition. One can be a physicist of genius without being an integral superman. In many cases, a certain distance can be very helpful in certain domains. Thus, no metaphysician has been a good physicist (I would like to have been able to say the contrary!). This example is typical. Because if the metaphysician contributes nothing to physics, he knows how to assimilate the work of others, while the physicist can be ignorant of the existence of metaphysics without damage for his science to himself -- and history teaches us that the metaphysics of physicists has delayed the progress of this science. (page 13)

Henceforth, we must leave the superman of Nietzsche, in order to surpass him - in order to construct a greater superman. That is not to say that we deny the historic meaning of the Nietzschean supermen who are of all colors. Because even the bad geniuses play an essential role in history. "Etiam mala peccatorum in bonum justorum cedunt." (Rom. Comm. p 120.) They serve, without willing it, the just ones

The philosophy of Nietzsche is an anthropocentric philosophy, while Thomist philosophy is theocentric. The Thomist philosophy is not a philosophy of the superman. For it, the question of the superman is a question of applied philosophy. But that is not to say that man is less great than in an anthropocentric philosophy. Just the contrary. An anthropocentric philosophy sins by exclusion. The man of the anthropocentric philosophy is not very great. In a sense, man is too small to occupy the center of the universe; and if he occupied it, the universe would be in its turn too small: and if we want an infinitely more vast universe, we want implicitly a man infinitely more vast. (page 14)

It is especially this last point that we must accentuate when we argue ad hominem. Absolutely speaking, it is false to say that the romantic philosophers have divinized man too much. No, their manner of divinizing him is not only a lowering of the idea of divinity, but equally a lowering of man. They did not know how to divinize him except by imposing limits which are contrary to his nature: because man is by his nature capacity for God: that is to say that he is naturally capable of a gratuitous elevation (surelevation) which makes him participate in the intimate life of the most pure absolute.

It is completely (tout?) the Thomist system that we oppose to the philosophy of Nietzsche. And it is completely (tout) the metaphysical and Christian ideal that we oppose to the limited and undefined ideal of the superman of Nietzsche.

Because, in sum, Nietzsche has left us only a description of the exterior signs of the psychological character of the superman: his ideal and his historic role are without doubt infinitely superior to those of the mass, which tends always toward disintegration, but this ideal has not been defined by him. (page 15)

And this ideal wasn't even definable, since he had no metaphysics, necessarily this ideal was blurred, and if he had not given as solution his theory of eternal recurrence, he would have found (bored? trouer?) at the level of the cosmos only another theory equally despairing and amorphous.

But Nietzsche has left us a phenomenal description of the superman, of his observable greatness. And it is this that will permit us to establish a strict

comparison between the superman that Aristotle and St. Thomas have equally described in this manner. And this comparison I will here make for ourselves, so that we do not (sanguis?) too impressed (? emprise? engresse?) to despise the psychological type of the superman of Nietzsche.

The approach (démarche?) of the IVth Book of the Nichomachean Ethics, which treats of fortitude, is an extremely difficult approach (démarche). Aristotle in it defends a superior human type which is accused by the mass of prodigality, of pride, of idleness, of irony, of disdain for the mass, of cruelty, of indifference, of indelicacy, etc. . . . in one word, the "bese" (German?) - villain.

(pages "a" and "b" - inserted between 15 and 16)

There was much debris fallen along the way. Christian life advances itself by necessary explosions: and each explosion of Christian culture entails its waste. The waste purifies the Christian world, the mystical body of Christ in state of growth. But do not forget that this waste has arisen from the bosom of the Church. That protestantism and calvinism were prepared, not by the Church, but in the Christendom adhering to the Church. Each of us carries in himself a little protestant or a little calvinist, a little puritan. We live in danger: we are wayfarers.

Jansenism, this pestilential doctrine so little different from puritanism, which was for centuries in the very bosom of the Church of Catholic Christendom, and which is far from being extinct, is our nearest danger.

Christendom must progress, and it, like mutations, proceeds by bounds. It brings about the new. This new, brought about by circumstances, and realized at the outset in certain superior types, dazes the very faithful mass. Remember what a revolutionary St. Thomas was, and how the most sincere of the faithful attacked him as a destroyer of tradition, and a man who worked for the destruction of the Church.

The ascendant movement is characterized by a certain intoxication: a disquieting intoxication for all those who don't know it: it is the intoxication of the genius, and of the Saint.

I would like to end by dwelling on two great virtues, two virtues integral to the cardinal virtue of fortitude: magnanimity and magnificence. Two virtues of which theologians, even Catholic ones, have not spoken for centuries.

Aristotle, in the 4th book of the Nicomachean Ethics, and St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica q. 129 & 134 of the IIa IIae, defend a superior human type who is accused by the mass of prodigality, of pride, of idleness, of irony, of disdain for the mass, of cruelty, of indifference, of indelicacy, of brutality -- etc. etc. . .

(page 16)

The liberal man is accused of prodigality, which the mass considers as a very grave vice, while parsimony would be a virtue. And when he is praised by the mass, it is always because of his utility. (Ethics 665.) But the liberal man does not give for utility. He gives in order to give. It is this which is found unreasonable. He gives, he makes sacrifices without pain. And he does not want to receive from others, and when he receives, he is embarrassed. "Ad liberalem pertinet ut vehementer superabundet in datione." He gives to the point of having too little for himself. And

the most liberal man, says Aristotle, is the one who receives his fortune as an inheritance, because the man who earned it by work is separated from it with difficulty: and all men love their own works immoderately: "parentes filios, poetae sua poemata." Since they have not known need, they disperse all the more easily. And when he has exaggerated, he is not sad: and he does not believe in the maxim of Simonides.

But then, how does this man differ from the prodigal? The liberal man does not waste. He gives with measure. But is it not simply just to give with measure? (page 17) And if he is virtuous, why does he give more than is necessary? But, the liberal man does not want to stop at the necessary: he wants what he gives to be a gift, and not a debt. And thus he is an extremist. But he is in the mean in this, that he does not waste: he does not throw pearls before the swine, as the prodigal.

The prodigal does not lack manliness, but measure. The parsimonious man stops at the useful, he only gives what he must, he stops at the necessary. And the parsimonious consider their parsimony as a virtue. And that explains, says Aristotle, why they believe that liberality is vicious: while parsimony is more vicious than prodigality: "prodigum multo meliorem illiberali," translated St. Thomas. Because, parsimony is incurable, while prodigality "de facile curatur." With a little exercise and reflection, the prodigal can attain the mean, while giving excessively. The parsimonious man, on the contrary, cannot ever give without being certain of a return. Not that the parsimonious man always desires the fortune of others: and he does not except gifts without hesitation (page 18); because he thinks that the one who seems to give has ulterior motives, and he fears for the security of his property. And in certain cases, he adds, the parsimonious men have a fear of fortune.

The parsimonious man is incurable. He finds himself in a vicious circle: and the one who climbs out (up? gravi?), is the one who (? c'est qu'il) is able always to make appeal to prudence. Read Ethics. p. 237 n. 697-8

The liberal man is therefore not natural, if by natural we intend what happens in the majority of cases. And nature, thus defined, tendit in defectum. The mass tends toward the defective.

This distinction remarked by St. Thomas is extremely important. Because the mass, by the very fact that it establishes parsimony as a virtue, and that it is forced to justify itself, already makes the morality of slaves.

The liberal man is an exceptional man, but the magnificent man is more so. If the magnificent man is necessarily liberal, the liberal man is not necessarily magnificent. Magnificence superadds greatness to liberality, quaedam magnitudo. (page 19)

Magnificence concerns enormous expenses in view of great honorable works, that is to say, disinterested ones, by opposition to useful works. It supposed an aesthetic taste, and is opposed thus to vulgar profusion, e.g. that of the musical comedies of Hollywood, in which there is no proportion between the expense and the intrinsic value of the work. In giving this example, I remain faithful to the taste of Aristotle, because he gave as examples the comedies of Megara, in which the actors appeared in purple in the first act.

In magnificence, there is all the same a certain disproportion between the expenses and the work, in this that the expenses are greater than the work, but that does not harm the work. On great works he spends largely and with joy. If he calculated his expenses too much, he would be stingy: "Quod aliquis sit multum diligens in computatione expensorum, pertinet ad parvificentiam:" the vice opposed to magnificence.

As example of magnificent works, Aristotle always cites works of art, temples, monuments, (boeuss?), music, etc.

(note on reverse page)

Why does God, perfect, create? Not having any need of the creature? A liberal man can understand it. He wants to communicate without (sans?) having any need of profit. A stingy man cannot comprehend it.

The same for parents. Many of whom are parents by accident. They do not comprehend how one can choose to have children while knowing that these children will give us pain, and that their existence calls for sacrifices.

(page 20)

A gift to the poor is not a gesture of magnificence, but of justice or liberality. In the eyes of the mass, magnificence is a waste, because it is not useful. And in the ethics of slaves, pure liberality, and magnificence, while they do not deny their idealistic value, are always inopportune. There was much poverty in Palestine at the time of Our Lord. But let us recall the passage of St. Mark the Evangelist: 14 X

What magnificence aims at are great disinterested works, and cultural: works of the spirit. And what is characteristic here, is the overflowing, the superabundance: the spiritual richness gratuitously communicated. And this gratuitous overflowing is essential to the spiritual. There is a gratuitous diffusion of self, in the measure one has goodness, and there is goodness in the measure that there is being. The more a being is superior and spiritual, the more its communication outside is gratuitous. In the angelic order, the more the angels are superior, the more their communication of their knowledge and their love to their inferiors becomes gratuitous. And every gift of God is absolutely gratuitous: creation and elevation above (surelevation).

Magnificence is a true triumph of pure spirituality over (page 21) the parsimonious poverty and stinginess of nature.

While magnificence essentially concerns diffusion outside, magnanimity specially concerns the subject considered in itself: it concerns above all a title of nobility which has no need of exterior goods to be exercised. The poor man cannot make (poser) acts of magnificence; but he can be magnanimous.

As magnificence, magnanimity seeks the honorable (l'honnête), the disinterested, as opposed to the useful. It has as objects honors. And there is a strange thing about virtue (Et voilà une drôle de vertu): cf. II II 129? c. (p. 116)

But, magnanimity, is it truly a virtue? And here are the objections of the morality of the slaves: ibid. a 3 (p 124- 131)

All that (mein?) us very far from this purely negative humility that Nietzsche disdained so in the Christianity of his time. For St. Thomas, humility is imperfect in the measure that it excludes magnanimity. And there is one of the difficult points about magnanimity: One borders always on the ridicule of pride and of vanity. (page 22)

It doesn't suffice to be what is called reasonable: it is necessary to have a judgment by connaturality; and this connaturality which judges spontaneously, supposes a natural greatness of soul.

One cannot be magnanimous without being humble: but humility is a part of temperance, and "materia temperantiae non habet de se aliquam magnitudinem," as fortitude (force). One sees it, temperance is not erected here into the supreme cardinal virtue, as it is in morality without metaphysics. And it is completely remarkable to see how these two parts of fortitude have gradually disappeared from treatises on theology after St. Thomas. With Duns Scotus, if I (puis mu frir?) to the texts that I have in hand, "patientia est nobilissima fortitudo," while for St. Thomas, "patientia non est potissima virtutum, sed deficit non solum a virtutibus theologicis, et prudentia, et iustitia, quae directe statuunt hominem in bono; sed etiam a fortitudine et temperantia, quae retrahunt a maioribus impedimentis." (II II 136 a2, c)

And I have sought in vain in moral theological treatises. A rare author would mention these virtues in a general division, but (page 23) without commenting. It was only in recent years that dominican theologians have reintroduced them into their moral treatises.

And this fact is extremely significant. If these virtues have disappeared from the treatises, it is because they have not raised any interest, and that is serious; and one can even ask oneself if they were not suspect!

These virtues are little practiced: quantum difficilis, say Aristotle and St. Thomas, as if they despaired, these great men.

But that does not prevent them from being the crowning achievement of what is greatest in humanity. "Magnanimitas est ornatus quidam omnium virtutum. Quia per magnanimitatem omnes virtutes efficiuntur maiores, eo quod ad magnanimitatem pertinet operare magnum in omnibus virtutibus. Et iterum non fit magnanimitas sine aliis virtutibus . . . Unde difficile est hominem magnanimum esse." (749)

Theologians have (can it be peut-etre?) seen the danger of vanity in magnanimity. And, as they have always more fear of vanity than of pusillanimity, one understands their preference. But that is still not thomistic. Because for St. Thomas (page 24) vanity is less grave than pusillanimity, however the vulgaris multitudo thinks about it. "Pusillanimitas deterior est . . . Vitium quod magis accidit propter maiorem inclinationem naturae humanae in ipsum, magis opponitur virtuti, . . . manifestum est autem, quod magis accidit aliquod esse pusillanimos . . . Et sic patet pusillanimitatem magis opponitur virtuti." (790)

Pusillanimity, says Aristotle, is not considered as a vice, but simply as a defect.

After these considerations, it is difficult to see what Nietzsche has brought to the

idea of the superman from the doctrinal point of view. It is necessary even to add that his idea remained very inferior to that one. But from the historical point of view, Nietzsche constituted, so to say, a dialectical moment in the evolution of cultural life. He reacted against egalitarianism which was and which still is in fact: egalitarianism which was achieved in communism: egalitarianism pushed up to the destruction of personality, to lose oneself in an ensemble one with the unity of first matter.

(page 25)

In reacting, Nietzsche has implicitly affirmed the rights of spirituality, spirituality which has a horror of uniformity, of what men call order. He has demonstrated the historical bankruptcy of the morality of slaves. And in doing this he has served us.

Theology must continue the study of this subject, but that surpasses my competence. I would like all the same to make allusion to certain points that the theologian would be able to expose.

It is true to say that all men are equal before the grace of God. That is to say that nature, although it be its degree of perfection, cannot posit any demand with respect to grace, nor impose a measure: God gives it gratuitously, and in the measure that He wills. And thus, a man very inferior is able to be uplifted above the greatest genius.

But that is not to say that grace reverses the natural order. It does all that without doing violence to nature: -- all that is realized suaviter. And it does not belong to us to pass judgment on the totally-new which results from the uplifting. But hierarchy must be maintained.

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The mystical body of Christ which embraces the angelic hierarchies and the human hierarchy is essentially hierarchical in its turn, and that without violence to the natural hierarchies. One understands why this idea is so little supported, -- the idea of absolute egalitarianism being so easy, and simplifying. It is so easy to say that, with the supernatural order given, nature no longer has any value. But that is not so easy - it is a heresy.

One can yet add to this, that the saint is not necessarily a superman such as we have described. He is a superman, without doubt, but in a sense infinitely more transcendent. And here is a very important distinction. Because every man is called to sanctity, although not all men are the stuff of genius.

And now a final reflection to conclude this series of lectures.

(un-numbered page)

We have studied the idea of hierarchy in the entire creation: the entire universe is essentially hierarchical: it is its way of imitating the Holy Trinity. But we have not stopped at the natural structure which philosophy can detect. Without doubt, this natural hierarchy was not troubled, nor reversed -- however, elevation to the supernatural order has assumed this universal hierarchy into a new hierarchy that one does not know how to measure with nature: a hierarchy which shows in a fashion absolutely hidden for us that the Spirit of God is so suberabundant that he breathes without measure and where he will.

Because it was not the first of the angels, nor some flashy human genius -- but a simple woman, a mother, a virgin who led a life so hidden, and of whom the angel said that she was full of grace and that the Lord was with her: it is she who has been elevated, not only to the summit of the human hierarchy, but to the summit of the universal hierarchy: -- the one we invoke as "the queen of the angels."

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We have presented the superman in a manner a little flashy. We have paused a great deal on humanly manifest signs of greatness. And without doubt we have always had in mind (en devant l'esprit?) un homme, while a simple woman, a mother, of whom the angel said that she was full of grace, and that the Lord was with her, a virgin who led a life very hidden, has been (qui ete) elevated to the summit of the human and angelic hierarchy: the queen of the angels.

